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I. Introduction: Goals and Boundaries
"Does  finance make a difference ... ?" Raymond Goldsmith (1969, p. 408)
Economists hold startlingly different opinions regarding the importance of the financial
system for economic growth.  Walter Bagehot (1873) and John Hicks (1969) argue that the
financial system played a critical role in igniting industrialization in England by facilitating the
mobilization of capital for 'immense works.'  Joseph Schumpeter (1912) contends that well-
functioning banks spur technological innovation by identifying and funding those entrepreneurs
with the best chances of successfully implementing innovative products and production processes.
In contrast, Joan Robinson (1952, p. 86) declares that "where enterprise leads finance follows."
According to this view, economic development creates demands for particular types of financial
arrangements, and the financial system responds automatically to these demands.  Moreover,
some economists just do not believe that the finance-growth relationship is important. Robert
Lucas (1988, p. 6) asserts that economists 'badly over-stress' the role of financial factors in
economic growth, while development economists frequently express their skepticism about the
role of the financial system by ignoring it (Anand Chandavarkar 1992). For example, a collection
of essays by the 'pioneers of development economics,' including three Nobel Laureates, does not
mention finance (Gerald Meir and Dudley Seers 1984). Furthermore, Nicholas Stem's (1989)
review of development economics does not discuss the financial system, even in a section that
lists omitted topics.  In light of these conflicting views, this paper uses existing theory to organize
an analytical framework of the finance-growth nexus and then assesses the quantitative
importance of the financial system in economic growth.2
Although conclusions must be stated hesitantly and with ample qualifications, the
preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive, first-order
relationship between financial development and economic growth. A growing body of work
would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and
institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that
the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow, responding passively to economic growth
and industrialization.  There is even evidence that the level of financial development is a good
predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and technological change.
Moreover, cross-country, case-study, industry-level, and firm-level analyses document extensive
periods when financial development -- or the lack thereof -- crucially affects the speed and pattern
of economic development.
To arrive at these conclusions and to highlight areas in acute need of additional research, I
organize the remainder of this paper as follows.  Section II explains what the financial system
does and how  it affects  -- and is affected  by -- economic  growth.  Theory  suggests  that financial
instruments, markets, and institutions arise to mitigate the effects of information and transaction
costs.'  Furthermore, a growing literature shows that differences in how well financial systems
reduce information and transaction costs influence saving rates, investment decisions,
technological innovation, and long-run growth rates.  Also, a comparatively less-developed
theoretical literature demonstrates how changes in economic activity can influence financial
systems.
These  frictions  include  the costs of  acquiring  information, enforcing contracts,  and
exchanging goods and financial claims.3
Section II also advocates the functional approach to understanding the role of financial
systems in economic growth. This approach focuses on the ties between growth and the quality
of the functions provided by the financial system.  These functions include facilitating the trading
of risk, allocating capital, monitoring managers, mobilizing savings, and easing the trading of
goods, services, and financial contracts. 2 The basic functions remain constant through time and
across countries.  There are large differences across countries and time, however, in the quality of
financial services and in the types of financial instruments, markets, and institutions that arise to
provide these services. While focusing on functions, this approach does not diminish the role of
institutions.  Indeed, the functional approach highlights the importance of examining an under-
researched topic: the relationship between financial structure -- the mix of financial instruments,
markets, and institutions -- and the provision of financial services. Thus, this approach
discourages a narrow focus on one financial instrument, like money, or a particular institution,
like banks.  Instead, the functional approach prompts a more comprehensive -- and more difficult
-- question: what is the relationship between financial structure and the functioning of the
financial system? 3
Part III then turns to the evidence.  While many gaps remain, broad cross-country
2 For different ways of categorizing financial functions, see David Cole and Betty Slade
(1991) and Robert C. Merton and Zvi Bodie (1995).
3 The major alternative approach to  studying finance and economic growth is based on the
seminal contributions of John Gurley and Edward Shaw (1955), James Tobin (1965), and Ronald
McKinnon (1973).  In their formal models, they focus on money. This narrow focus can restrict the
analysis of the finance-growth nexus, and lead to a misleading distinction between the "real" and
financial sectors.  In contrast, the functional approach highlights the value added of the financial
sector.  The financial system is a 'real' sector: it researches firms and managers, exerts corporate
control, and facilitates risk management,  exchange, and resource mobilization.4
comparisons, individual country studies, industry-level analyses, and firm-level investigations
point in the same direction: the functioning of financial systems is importantly linked to economic
growth.  Specifically, countries with larger banks and more active stock markets grow faster over
subsequent decades even after controlling for many other factors underlying economic growth.
Industries and firms that rely heavily on external financing grow disproportionately faster in
countries with well-development banks and securities markets than in countries with poorly-
developed financial systems.  Moreover, ample country studies suggest that differences in
financial development have, in some countries over extensive periods, critically influenced
economic development.  Yet, these results do not imply that finance is everywhere and always
exogenous to economic growth. Economic activity and technological innovation undoubtedly
affect the structure and quality of financial systems. Innovations in telecommunications and
computing have undeniably affected the financial services industry.  Moreover, 'third factors',
such as a country's legal system and political institutions certainly drive both financial and
economic development at critical junctures during the growth process. Nevertheless, the weight
of evidence suggests that financial systems are a fundamental feature of the process of economic
development and that economists will not enjoy a satisfactory understanding of the factors
underlying economic growth until we understand more about the evolution and structure of
financial systems.
As in any critique, I omit or treat cursorily important issues. Here I highlight two. 4 First,
I do not discuss the relationship between international finance and growth.  This paper narrows its
' Also, the theoretical review focuses on purely real economies and essentially ignores
emerging work on finance and growth in monetary economies.5
conceptual focus by studying the financial services available to an economy regardless of the
geographic source of those services. In measuring financial development, however, researchers
often do not account sufficiently for international trade in financial services.  Second, the paper
does not discuss policy.  Given the links between the functioning of the financial system and
economic growth, designing optimal financial sector policies is critically important.  A rigorous
discussion of financial sector policies, however, would require a long article or book by itself. 5
Instead, this paper seeks to pull together a diverse and active literature into a coherent view of the
financial system in economic growth.
IL  The Functions Qfthe  Financial System
A. Functional  Approach:  Introduction
The costs of acquiring information and making transactions create incentives for the
emergence of financial markets and institutions.  Put differently, in an Kenneth Arrow (1964)-
Gerard Debreu (1959) state-contingent claim framework with no information or transaction costs,
there is no need for a financial system that expends resources researching projects, scrutinizing
managers, or designing arrangements to ease risk management and facilitate transactions.  Thus,
any theory of the role of the financial system in economic growth (implicitly or explicitly) adds
specific frictions to the Arrow-Debreu model.  Financial markets and institutions may arise to
ameliorate the problems created by information and transactions frictions. Different types and
combinations of information and transaction costs motivate distinct financial contracts, markets,
' The financial policy literature is immense. See, for example, Philip Brock (1992), Alberto
Giovannini and Martha De Melo (1993), Gerard Caprio, et al. (1994), and Maxwell Fry (1995).6
and institutions.
In arising to ameliorate transaction and information costs, financial systems serve one
primary function: they facilitate the allocation of resources, across space and time, in an uncertain
environment (Merton and Bodie 1995, p. 12). To organize the vast literature on finance and
economic activity, I break this primary function into five basic functions. Specifically, financial
systems
*  facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk,
*  allocate resources,
*  monitor managers and exert corporate control,
*  mobilize savings, and
*  facilitate the exchange of goods and services.
This section explains how particular market frictions motivate the emergence of financial
markets and intermediaries that provide these five financial functions, and explains how these
financial functions affect economic growth.  I examine two channels through which each financial
function may affect economic growth:  capital accumulation and technological innovation.  On
capital accumulation, one class of growth models uses capital externalities or linear production
functions ("Ak models") to generate steady-state per capita growth (Paul Romer 1986; Lucas
1988; Sergio Rebelo 1991). In these models, the functions performed by the financial system
affect steady-state growth by influencing the rate of capital formation.  The financial system
affects capital accumulation either by altering the savings rate or by re-allocating savings among
different capital producing technologies.  On technological innovation, a second class of growth7
models focuses on the invention of new production processes and goods (Romer 1990; Gene
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman 1991; and Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt 1992). In these
models, the functions performed by the financial system affect steady-state growth by altering the
rate of technological innovation.  Thus, as sketched in Figure 1, the remainder of this section
discusses how specific market frictions motivate the emergence of financial contracts, markets,
and intermediaries and how these financial arrangements provide five financial functions that
affect saving and allocations decisions in ways that influence economic growth.
B. Facilitating Risk Amelioration
In the presence of  specific information and transaction costs, financial markets and
institutions may arise to ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk.  This subsection consider
two types of risk: liquidity risk and idiosyncratic risk.
Liquidity is the ease and speed with which agents can convert assets into purchasing
power at agreed prices.  Thus, real estate is typically less liquid than equities, and equities in the
United States are typically more liquid than equities traded on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
Liquidity risk arises due to the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a medium of
exchange.  Informational asymmetries and transaction costs may inhibit liquidity and intensify
liquidity risk.  These frictions create incentives for the emergence of financial markets and
institutions that augment liquidity.  Liquid capital markets, therefore, are markets where it is
relatively inexpensive to trade financial instruments and where there is little uncertainty about the
timing and settlement of those trades.
Before delving into formal models of liquidity and economic activity, some intuition and8
history may help motivate the discussion.  The link between liquidity and economic development
arises because some high-return projects require a long-run commitment of capital, but savers do
not like to relinquish control of their savings for long-periods. Thus, if the financial system does
not augment the liquidity of long-term investments, less investment is likely to occur in the high-
return projects.  Indeed, Sir John Hicks (1969, p. 143-145) argues that capital market
improvements that mitigated liquidity risk were primary causes of the industrial revolution in
England.  According to Hicks, the products manufactured during the first decades of the industrial
revolution had been invented much earlier. Thus, technological innovation did not spark
sustained growth.  Many of these existing inventions, however, required large injections and long-
run commitments of capital.  The critical new ingredient that ignited growth in 18th century
England was capital market liquidity.  With liquid capital markets, savers can hold liquid assets --
like equity, bonds, or demand deposits -- that they can quickly and easily sell if they seek access
to their savings.  Simultaneously, capital markets transform these liquid financial instruments into
long-term capital investments in illiquid production processes.  Because the industrial revolution
required large commitments of capital for long periods, the industrial revolution may not have
occurred without this liquidity transformation. "The industrial revolution therefore had to wait
for the financial revolution..." (Valerie Bencivenga, Bruce Smith, and Ross Starr, 1966, p. 243)6
Economists have recently modeled the emergence of financial markets in response to
liquidity risk and examined how these financial markets affect economic growth.  For example, in
6  The financial revolution included the emergence of joint-stock companies with
nonredeemable capital.  The Dutch East India Company made capital permanent in 1609,
and Cromwell made the English East India Company capital permanent in 1650. These
financial innovations formed the basis of liquid equity markets (Larry Neal 1990).9
Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig's (1983) seminal model of liquidity, a fraction of savers
receive shocks after choosing between two investments: an illiquid, high-return project and a
liquid, low-return project.  Those receiving shocks want access to their savings before the illiquid
project produces.  This risk creates incentives for investing in the liquid, low-return projects.  The
model assumes that it is prohibitively costly to verify whether another individual has received a
shock or not.  This information cost assumption rules out state-contingent insurance contracts and
creates an incentive for financial markets -- markets where individuals issue and trade securities -
- to emerge.  In Ross Levine (1991), savers receiving shocks can sell their equity claims on the
profits of the illiquid production technology to others.  Market participants do not verify whether
other agents received shocks or not; participants simply trade in impersonal stock exchanges.
Thus, with liquid stock markets, equity holders can readily sell their shares, while firms have
permanent access to the capital invested by the initial shareholders. By facilitating trade, stock
markets reduce liquidity risk.'  As stock market transaction costs fall, more investment occurs in
the illiquid, high-return project.  If illiquid projects enjoy sufficiently large externalities, then
greater stock market liquidity induces faster steady-state growth.
Thus far, information costs -- the costs of verifying whether savers have received a shock -
- have motivated the existence of stock markets.  Trading costs can also highlight the role of
liquidity.  For example, different production technologies may have a wide array of gestation
periods for converting current output into future capital, where longer-run technologies enjoy
' Frictionless stock markets, however, do not eliminate liquidity risk.  That is, stock
markets do not replicate the equilibrium that exists when insurance contracts can be
written contingent on observing whether an agent receives a shock or not.10
greater returns.  Investors, however, may be reluctant to relinquish control of their savings for
very long periods.  Thus, long-gestation production technologies require that ownership be
transferred throughout the life of the production process in secondary securities markets
(Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr 1995). If exchanging ownership claims is costly, then longer-run
production technologies will be less attractive. Thus, liquidity -- as measured by secondary
market trading costs -- affects production decisions.  Greater liquidity will induce a shift to
longer-gestation, higher-return technologies.
Besides stock markets, financial intermediaries -- coalitions of agents that combine to
provide financial services -- may also enhance liquidity and reduce liquidity risk.  As discussed
above, Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) model assumes it is prohibitively costly to observe shocks
to individuals, so it is impossible to write incentive compatible state-contingent insurance
contracts.  Under these conditions, banks can offer liquid deposits to savers and undertake a
mixture of liquid, low-return investments to satisfy demands on deposits and illiquid, high-return
investments.  By providing demand deposits and choosing an appropriate mixture of liquid and
illiquid investments, banks provide complete insurance to savers against liquidity risk while
simultaneously facilitating long-run investments in high return projects.  Banks replicate the
equilibrium allocation of capital that exists with observable shocks. By eliminating liquidity risk,
banks can increase investment in the high-return, illiquid asset and accelerate growth (Bencivenga
and Smith 1991). There is a problem, however, with this description of the role of banks as
reducing liquidity risk.  The banking equilibrium is not incentive compatible if agents can trade in
liquid equity markets; if equity markets exist, all agents will use equities; none will use banks
(Charles Jacklin 1987). Thus, in this context, banks will only emerge to provide liquidity if thereI1
are sufficiently large impediments to trading in securities markets (Gary Gorton and George
Pennacchi 1990).8
Theory, however, suggests that enhanced liquidity has an ambiguous affect on saving rates
and economic growth. 9 In most models, greater liquidity (a) increases investment returns and (b)
lowers uncertainty.  Higher returns ambiguously affect saving rates due to well-known income
and substitution effects. Further, lower uncertainty ambiguously affects savings rates (David
Levhari and T.N. Srinivasan 1969). Thus, saving rates may rise or fall as liquidity rises.  Indeed,
in a model with physical capital externalities, saving rates could fall enough, so that growth
actually decelerates with greater liquidity (Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano 1994).2'
Besides reducing liquidity risk, financial systems may also mitigate the risks associated
with individual projects, firms, industries, regions, countries, etc.  Banks, mutual funds, and
* Goldsmith (1969, p. 396) notes that "Claims against financial institutions are generally
easier to liquidate (i.e. to turn into cash without or with only insignificant delay,
formality, and cost) than are primary debt securities.  They have the additional great
advantage of being completely divisible, whereas primary securities are usually issued in
fixed amounts and often in amounts that make them very inconvenient for purchase and
sale when lenders have small resources and when numerous individual purchase and sale
transactions are involved."
9 The  analyses  described  thus  far  focus  on  the  links  between  liquidity  and  capital
accumulation.  Yet,  liquidity  may  also  affect  the  rate  of  technological change  if  long-run
commitments of resources to research and development promote technological innovation.
Similarly, although greater liquidity unambiguously raises the real return on savings,
more liquidity may induce a reallocation of investment out of initiating new capital
investments and into purchasing claims on ongoing projects.  This may lower the rate of
real investment enough to decelerate growth (Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr 1995).12
securities markets all provide vehicles for trading, pooling, and diversifying risk."  The financial
system's ability to provide risk diversification services can affect long-run economic growth by
altering resource allocation and the saving rates. The basic intuition is straightforward.  While
savers generally do not like risk, high-return projects tend to be riskier than low-return projects.
Thus, financial markets that ease risk diversification tend to induce a portfolio shift toward
projects with higher expected returns (Gilles Saint-Paul 1992; Michael Devereux and Gregor
Smith 1994; and Maurice Obstfeld 1994). Greater risk sharing and more efficient capital
allocation, however, have theoretically ambiguous effects on saving rates as noted above. The
savings rate could fall enough so that, when coupled with an externality-based or linear growth
model, overall economic growth falls.  With externalities, growth could fall sufficiently so that
overall welfare falls with greater risk diversification.
Besides the link between risk diversification and capital accumulation, risk diversification
can also affect technological change.  Agents are continuously trying to make technological
advances to gain a profitable market niche.  Besides yielding profits to the innovator, successful
innovation accelerates technological change. Engaging in innovation is risky, however.  The
ability to hold a diversified portfolio of innovative projects reduces risk and promotes investment
in growth-enhancing innovative activities (with sufficiently risk averse agents).  Thus, financial
systems that ease risk diversification can accelerate technological change and economic growth
(Robert King and Levine 1993c).
"  Although the recent uses of options and futures contracts to hedge risk have been well
publicized, the development of these financial contracts is by no means recent.  Joseph de
la Vega published the first treatise on options contracts, futures contracts, and securities
market speculation, Confusion de Confusiones, in 1688!13
C. Acquiring Information About Investments and Allocating Resources
It is difficult and costly to evaluate firms, managers, and market conditions as discussed
by Vincent Carosso (1970).  Individual savers may not have the time, capacity, or means to
collect and process information on a wide array of enterprises, managers, and economic
conditions.  Savers will be reluctant to invest in activities about which there is little reliable
information.  Consequently, high information costs may keep capital from flowing to its highest
value use.
Information acquisition costs create incentives for financial intermediaries to emerge
(Diamond 1984; and John Boyd and Edward Prescott 1986). Assume, for example, that there is a
fixed cost to acquiring information about a production technology.  Without intermediaries, each
investor must pay the fixed cost.  In response to this information cost structure, however, groups
of individuals may form (or join or use) financial intermediaries to economize on the costs of
acquiring and processing information about investments.  Instead of each individual acquiring
evaluation skills and then conducting evaluations, an intermediary can do it for all its members.
Economizing on information acquisition costs facilitates the acquisition of information about
investment opportunities and thereby improves resource allocation.
The ability to acquire and process information may have important growth implications.
Since many firms and entrepreneurs will solicit capital, financial intermediaries and markets that
are better at selecting the most promising firms and managers will induce a more efficient14
allocation of capital and faster growth (Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic 1990).  Bagehot
(1873, p. 53) expressed this view over 120 years ago.
(England's financial) organization is so useful because it is so easily adjusted.
Political economists say that capital sets towards the most profitable trades, and
that it rapidly leaves the less profitable non-paying trades.  But in ordinary
countries this is a slow process, ... In England, however, ... capital runs as surely
and instantly where it is most wanted, and where there is most to be made of it, as
water runs to find its level.
England's financial system did a better job at identifying and funding profitable ventures than
most countries in the mid- 1  800s, which helped England enjoy comparatively greater economic
success.  12
Besides identifying the best production technologies, financial intermediaries may also
boost the rate of technological innovation by identifying those entrepreneurs with the best chances
of successfully initiating new goods and production processes (King and Levine 1993c). As
eloquently stated by Schumpeter (1912, p. 74),
The banker, therefore, is not so much primarily a middleman, ... He authorises
people, in the name of society as it were, ... (to innovate).
Stock markets may also influence the acquisition and dissemination of information about
firms.  As stock markets become larger (Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz 1980) and more
liquid (Albert Kyle 1984; and Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole 1993), market participants may
have greater incentives to acquire information about firms.  Intuitively, with larger more liquid
2Indeed, England's advanced financial system also did a good job at identifying profitable
ventures in other countries, such as Canada, the United States, and Australia during the 19th century.
England was able to 'export' financial services (as well as financial capital) to many economies with
underdeveloped financial systems  (Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback 1986).15
markets, it is easier for an agent who has acquired information to disguise this private information
and make money.  Thus, large, liquid stock markets can stimulate the acquisition of information.
Moreover, this improved information about firms should substantially improve resource
allocation with corresponding implications for economic growth (Merton 1987). However,
existing theories have not yet assembled the links of the chain from the functioning of stock
markets, to information acquisition, and finally to aggregate long-run economic growth.
Debate still exists over the importance of large, liquid, efficient stock markets in
enhancing the creation and distribution information about firms.  Stock markets aggregate and
disseminate information through published prices. Even agents that do not undertake the costly
processes of evaluating firms, managers, and market conditions can observe stock prices that
reflect the information obtained by others.  This public goods aspect of acquiring information can
cause society to devote too few resources to information acquisition. The public goods feature of
the information disclosed through stock markets may be sufficiently large, such that information
gains from large, liquid stock markets are small.  Stiglitz (1985) argues that, because stock
markets quickly reveal information through posted prices, there will be few incentives for
spending  private resources to acquire information that is almost immediately publicly available.
D. Monitoring Managers and Exerting Corporate Control
Besides reducing the costs of acquiring information ex ante, financial contracts, markets,
and intermediaries may arise to mitigate the information acquisition and enforcement costs of
monitoring firm managers and exerting corporate control ex post, i.e., after financing the activity.
For example, firm owners will create financial arrangements that compel firm managers to16
manage the firm in the best interests of the owners.  Also, "outside" creditors -- banks, equity and
bond holders -- that do not manage firms on a day-to-day basis will create financial arrangements
to compel inside owners and managers to run firms in accordance with the interests of outside
creditors.  The absence of financial arrangement that enhance corporate control may impede the
mobilization of savings from disparate agents and thereby keep capital from flowing to profitable
investments (Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss 1983).  Since this vast literature has been carefully
reviewed (Mark Gertler 1988; and Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny 1996), this subsection (1)
notes a few ways in which financial contracts, markets, and institutions improve monitoring and
corporate control, and (2) reviews how these financial arrangements for monitoring influence
capital accumulation, resource allocation, and long-run growth.
Consider, for example, the simple assumption that it is costly for outsider investors in a
project to verify project returns.  This creates important frictions that can motivate financial
development.  Insiders have incentives to misrepresent project returns to outsiders.  Given
verification costs, however, it is socially inefficient for outsiders to monitor in all circumstances.
With "costly state verification" (and other assumptions including risk-neutral borrowers and
verification costs that are independent of project quality), the optimal contract between outsiders
and insiders is a debt contract (Robert Townsend 1979; and Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig
1985). Specifically, there is an equilibrium interest rate, r, such that when the project return is
sufficiently high, insiders pay r to outsiders and outsiders do not monitor.  When project returns
are insufficient, the borrower defaults and the lenders pay the monitoring costs to verify the
project's return.  These verification costs impede investment decisions and reduce economic
efficiency.  Verification costs imply that outsiders constrain firms from borrowing to expand17
investment because higher leverage implies greater risk of default and higher verification
expenditures by lenders. Thus, collateral and financial contracts that lower monitoring and
enforcement costs reduce impediments to efficient investment (Stephen Williamson 1  987b; Ben
Bemanke and Gertler 1989, 1990; Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden 1995).'3
Besides particular types of financial contracts, financial intermediaries can reduce
information costs even further. If borrowers must obtain funds from many outsiders, financial
intermediaries can economize on monitoring costs.  The financial intermediary mobilizes the
savings of many individuals and lends these resources to project owners. This "delegated
monitor" arrangement economizes on aggregate monitoring costs because a borrower is only
monitored by the intermediary, not all individual savers (Diamond 1984). Besides reducing
duplicate monitoring, a financial system that facilitates corporate control "... also makes possible
the efficient separation of ownership from management of the firm. This in turn makes feasible
efficient specialization in production according to the principle of comparative advantage"
(Merton and Bodie 1995, p. 14). The delegated monitor arrangement, however, creates a
potential problem: who will monitor the monitor (Stefan Krasa and Anne Villamil 1992)?  Savers,
however, do not have to monitor the intermediary if the intermediary holds a diversified portfolio
(and agents can easily verify that the intermediary's portfolio is well-diversified). With a well-
diversified portfolio, the intermediary can always meet its promise to pay the deposit interest rate
to depositors, so that depositors never have to monitor the bank.  Thus, well-diversified financial
13 Costly state verification can produce credit rationing. Since higher interest rates are
linked with a higher probability of default and monitoring costs, intermediaries may keep
rates  low and ration credit using non-price mechanisms (Williamson 1986, 1987a).18
intermediaries can foster efficient investment by lowering monitoring costs.4 Furthermore, as
financial intermediaries and firms develop long-run relationships, this can further lower
information acquisition costs.  The reduction in information asynmmetries  can in turn ease external
funding constraints and facilitate better resource allocation (Sharpe 1990).'  In terms of long-run
growth,  financial arrangements that improve corporate control tend to promote faster capital
accumulation and growth by improving the allocation of capital (Bencivenga and Smith 1993;
and Aubhik Khan 1994).
Besides debt contracts and banks, stock markets may also promote corporate control
(Michael Jensen and William Meckling 1976).  For example, public trading of shares in stock
markets that efficiently reflect information about firms allows owners to link managerial
compensation to stock prices.  Linking stock performance to manager compensation helps align
the interests of managers with those of owners (Diamond and Robert Verrecchia 1982; and Jensen
and Kevin Murphy 1990). Similarly, if takeovers are easier in well-developed stock markets and
if managers of under-performing firms are fired following a takeover, then better stock markets
can promote better corporate control by easing takeovers of poorly managed firms.  The threat of
a takeover will help align managerial incentives with those of the owners (David Scharfstein
'4  Diamond  (1984) assumes that intermediaries exist  and shows that the intermediary
arrangement economizes on monitoring costs.  Williamson (1986) shows how intermediaries arise
endogenously.  Furthermore, I have only discussed models in which state verification proceeds
nonstochastically: if borrowers default, lenders verify. Stochastic monitoring, however, may further
reduce verification costs (Bernanke and Gertler 1989; and Boyd and Smith 1994).
" The long-run relationships between a banker and client may impose a cost on the client.
Since the bank is well informed about the firm, the bank may have bargaining power over the firm's
profits.  If the bank breaks its ties to the firm, other investors will be reluctant to invest in the firm.
Firms may therefore diversify out of  bank financing to reduce their vulnerability ( Rajan 1992).19
1988; and Jeremy Stein 1988).  I am not aware of models that directly link the role of stock
markets in improving corporate governance with long-run economic growth.
There are disagreements, however, about the importance of stock markets in corporate
control.  Inside investors probably have better information about the corporation than outsiders.
Thus, if well-informed owners are willing to sell their company, less well-informed outsiders may
demand a premium to purchase the firm due to the information asymmetry (Stewart Myers and
Nicholas Majluf 1984). Thus, asymmetric information may reduce the efficacy of corporate
takeovers as a mechanism for exerting corporate control.  Stiglitz (1985) makes three additional
arguments about takeovers.  First, if an acquiring firm expends lots of resources obtaining
information, the results of this research will be observed by other market participants when the
acquiring firm bids for shares.  This will induce others to bid for shares, so that the price rises.
The firm that expended resources obtaining information must, therefore, pay a higher price than it
would have to pay if  'free-riding' firms could not observe its bid.  Thus, the rapid public
dissemination of costly information will reduce incentives for obtaining information and making
effective takeover bids.  Second, there is a public good nature to takeovers that may decrease the
incentives for takeovers.  If the takeover succeeds, and the share price rises, then those original
equity holders that did not sell make a big profit without expending resources.  This creates an
incentive for existing shareholders to not sell if they think the value of the firm will rise following
the takeover.  Thus, value-increasing takeovers may fail because the acquiring firm will have to
pay a high price, which will reduce incentives for researching firms in the hopes of taking over
them.  Third, current managers often can take strategic actions to deter takeovers and maintain
their positions.  This argues against an important role for liquid stock markets in promoting sound20
corporate governance.
Moreover, liquid equity markets that facilitate takeovers may hurt resource allocation
(Shleifer and Lawrence Summers 1988; and Randal Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990). A
takeover typically involves a change in management.  Existing implicit contracts between former
managers and workers, suppliers, and other stakeholders in the firms do not bind new owners and
managers to the same extent that they bound the original managers.  Thus, a takeover allows new
owners and managers to break implicit agreements and transfer wealth from firm stakeholders to
themselves.  While new owners may profit, there may be a deterioration in the efficiency of
resource allocation.  Overall welfare may fall.  To the extent that well-functioning equity markets
help takeovers, this may allow hostile takeovers that lead to a fall in the efficiency of resource
allocation.  Furthermore, liquid stock markets may reduce incentives for owners to monitor
managers (Amar Bhide 1993). By reducing exit costs, stock market liquidity encourages more
diffuse ownership with fewer incentives and greater impediments to actively overseeing managers
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Thus, the theoretical signs on the links in the chain from
improvements in stock markets to better corporate control to faster economic growth are still
ambiguous.  16
E. Mobilizing Savings
Mobilization --pooling -- involves the agglomeration of capital from disparate savers for
investment.  Without access to multiple investors, many production processes would be
16 Some research also suggests that excessive stock trading can induce 'noise' into the market
and hinder efficient resource allocation (Bradford DeLong, et al. 1989).21
constrained to economically inefficient scales (Erik Sirri and Peter Tufano 1995). Furthermore,
mobilization involves the creation of small denomination instruments.  These instruments provide
opportunities for households to hold diversified portfolios, invest in efficient scale firms, and to
increase asset liquidity.  Without pooling, household's would have to buy and sell entire firms.
By enhancing risk diversification, liquidity, and the size of feasible firms, therefore, mobilization
improves resource allocation (Sirri and Tufano 1995).
Mobilizing the savings of many disparate savers is costly, however.  Mobilizing savings
involves (a) overcoming the transaction costs associated with collecting savings from different
individuals and (b) overcoming the informational asymmetries associated with making savers feel
comfortable in relinquishing control of their savings.  Indeed, much of  Carosso's (1970) history
of Investment Banking in America is a description of the diverse and elaborate means employed
by investment banks to raise capital. As early as the mid- 1  880s, some investment banks used
their European connections to raise capital abroad for investment in the United States. Other
investment banks established close connections with major banks and industrialists in the United
States to mobilize capital.  And, still other investment banks used newspaper advertisements,
pamphlets, and a vast sales force that traveled through every state and territory selling securities
to individual households.  Thus, mobilizing resources involved a range of transaction costs.
Moreover, "mobilizers" had to convince savers of the soundness of the investments.  Toward this
end, intermediaries are generally concerned about establishing stellar reputations, so that savers
feel comfortable about entrusting their savings to the intermediary (DeLong 1991; and Naomi
Lamoreaux 1995).
In light of the transaction and information costs associated with mobilizing savings from22
many agents, numerous financial arrangements may arise to mitigate these frictions and facilitate
pooling." 1 Specifically, mobilization may involve multiple bilateral contracts between productive
units raising capital and agents with surplus resources.  The joint stock company in which many
individuals invest in a new legal entity, the firm, represents a prime example of multiple bilateral
mobilization.  To economize on the transactions and information costs associated with multiple
bilateral contracts, pooling may also occur through intermediaries as discussed above, where
thousands of investors entrust their wealth to intermediaries that invest in hundreds of firms (Sirri
and Tufano 1995, p. 83).
Financial systems that are more effective at pooling the savings of individuals can
profoundly affect economic development. Besides the direct effect of better savings mobilization
on capital accumulation, better savings mobilization can improve resource allocation and boost
technological innovation (Bagehot 1873, p. 3-4):
We have entirely lost the idea that any undertaking likely to pay, and seen to be
likely, can perish for want of money; yet no idea was more familiar to our
ancestors, or is more common in most countries.  A citizen of Long in Queen
Elizabeth's time ... would have thought that it was no use inventing railways (if he
could have understood what a railway meant), for you would have not been able to
collect the capital with which to make them.  At this moment, in colonies and-  all
rude countries, there is no large sum of transferable money; there is not fund from
which you can borrow, and out of which you can make immense works.
Thus, by effectively mobilizing resources for projects, the financial system may play a crucial
"See  Sections II.C and II.D. for citations on the emergence of financial intermediaries23
role in permitting the adoption of better technologies and thereby encouraging growth.  This
intuition was clarified 100 years later by in McKinnon (1973, p. 13):
The farmer could provide his own savings to increase slightly the commercial
fertilizer that he is now using, and the return on this marginal new investment
could be calculated.
The important point, however, is the virtual impossibility of a poor
farmer's financing from his current savings the whole of the balanced investment
needed to adopt the new technology.  Access to external financial resources is
likely to be necessary over the one or two years when the change takes place.
Without this access, the constraint of self-finance sharply biases investment
strategy toward marginal variations within the traditional technology.
F. Facilitating Exchange
Besides easing savings mobilization and thereby expanding the of set production
technologies available to an economy, financial arrangements that lower transaction costs can
promote specialization, technological innovation and growth.  The links between facilitating
transactions, specialization, innovation, and economic growth were core elements of Adam
Smith's  (1776) Wealth of Nations.  Smith (1776, p. 7) argued that division of labor --
specialization -- is the principal factor underlying productivity improvements. With greater
specialization, workers are more likely to invent better machines or production processes.
I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those machines by
which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been originally
owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to discover easier and
readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is
directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety
of things. Smith (1776, p. 3)
The critical issue for our purposes is that the financial system can promote specialization.
Adam Smith  argued that lower transaction costs would permit greater specialization since
specialization requires more transactions than an autarkic environment. Smith phrased his24
argument about the lowering of transaction costs and technological innovation in terms of the
advantages of money over barter (p. 26-27).  Information costs, however, may also motivate the
emergence of money.  Since it is costly to evaluate the attributes of goods, barter exchange is very
costly. Thus, an easily recognizable medium of exchange may arise to facilitate exchange (King
and Charles Plosser 1986; and Williamson and Randall Wright 1994).)  The drop in transaction
and information costs is not necessarily a one time fall when economies move to money,
however.  For example, in the 1  800s, "...  it was primarily the development of institutions that
facilitated the exchange of technology in the market that enabled creative individuals to specialize
in and become more productive at invention" (Lamoreaux and Kenneth Sokoloff, 1996, p. 17).
Thus, transaction and information costs may continue to fall through a variety of mechanisms, so
that financial and institutional development continually boost specialization and innovation via
the same channels illuminated over 200 years ago by Adam Smith.' 9
Modem theorists have attempted to illuminate more precisely the ties between exchange,
specialization, and innovation (Greenwood and Smith 1996). More specialization requires more
transactions.  Since each transaction is costly, financial arrangements that lower transaction costs
will facilitate greater specialization. In this way, markets that promote exchange encourage
18 This focus on money as a medium of exchange that lowers transaction and information
costs  by  overcoming the  "double coincidence of wants problem" and  by acting  as an  easily
recognizable medium of exchange enjoys a long history in monetary theory, from Smith (1776), to
Stanley Jevons (1875), to more formal models as reviewed by Joseph Ostroy and Starr (1990).
9 Financial systems can also promote the accumulation of human capital by lowering the
costs of intertemporal trade, i.e., by facilitating borrowing for the accumulation of skills (Thomas
Cooley and Smith 1992; and Jose DeGregorio 1996). If human capital accumulation is not subject
to diminishing returns on a social level, financial arrangements  that ease human capital creation help
accelerate economic growth.25
productivity gains.  There may also be feedback from these productivity gains to financial market
development.  If there are fixed costs associated with establishing markets, then higher income
per capita implies that these fixed costs are less burdensome as a share of per capita income.
Thus, economic development can spur the development of financial markets.
This approach to linking financial markets with specialization has not yet formally
completed Adam Smith's story of innovation.  That is, a better market -- a market with lower
transactions costs -- does not stimulate the invention of new and better production technologies in
Greenwood and Smith's (1996) model.  Instead, lower transaction costs expands the set of "on
the shelf'  production processes that are economically attractive. Also, the model defines better
"market" as a system for supporting more specialized production processes.  This does not
explain the emergence of financial instruments or institutions that lower transactions costs and
thereby produce an environment that naturally promotes specialized production technologies.
This is important because we want to understand the two links of the chain: what about the
economic environment creates incentives for financial arrangements to arise and to function well
or poorly, and what are.  the implications for economic activity of the emerging financial
arrangements?
G. A Parable
Thus far, I have discussed each financial function in isolation.  This, however, may
encourage an excessively narrow focus on individual functions and impede the synthesis of these
distinct functions into a coherent understanding of the financial system's role in economic
development.  This is not a necessary implication.  In fact, by identifying the individual functions26
performed by the financial system, the functional approach can foster a more complete
understanding of finance and growth.
Earlier authors often provided illustrative stories of the ties between finance and
development.  For example Schumpeter (1912, p. 58-74) and McKinnon (1973, p. 5-18) provide
broad descriptions -- parables -- of the roles of the financial system in economic development.
Just as Smith (1776) used the pin factory to illustrate the importance of specialization,
Schumpeter used the relationship between banker and industrialist to illustrate the importance of
the financial system in choosing and adopting new technologies, and McKinnon highlighted the
importance of the financial system in promoting the use of better agricultural techniques.
However, even Schumpeter and McKinnon did not amalgamate all of the financial functions into
their stories of finance and development. Consequently, this subsection synthesizes the individual
financial functions into a simple parable about how the financial system affects economic growth.
Consider Fred, who has just developed a design for a new truck that extracts rocks from a
quarry better than existing trucks.  Fred's idea for manufacturing trucks requires an intricate
assembly line with specialized labor and capital. Highly specialized production processes would
be difficult without a medium of exchange. Fred would find it prohibitively costly to pay his
workers and suppliers using barter exchange.  Financial instruments and markets that facilitate
transactions will allow and promote specialization and thereby permit Fred to organize his truck
assembly line.  Moreover, the increased specialization induced by easier transactions may foster
learning-by-doing and innovation by the workers specializing on their individual tasks.
Production requires capital.  Even if Fred had the savings, he would not wish to put all of
his savings in one risky investment. Also, Fred wants ready access to savings for unplanned27
events; he is reluctant to tie-up his savings in the truck project, which will not yield profits, if it
does yield profits, for a long time.  Fred's distaste for risk and desire for liquidity create
incentives for him to (a) diversify the family's investments and (b) not commit too much of his
savings to an illiquid project, like producing a new truck. In fact, if Fred must invest
disproportionately in his illiquid truck project, he may forgo his plan.  Without a mechanism for
managing risk, the project may die. Thus, liquidity, risk pooling, and diversification will help
Fred start his innovative project.
Moreover, Fred will require outside funding if he has insufficient savings to initiate his
truck project.  There are problems, however, in mobilizing savings for Fred's truck company.
First, it is very costly and time consuming to collect savings from individual savers.  Fred does
not have the time, connections, and information to collect savings from everyone in his town and
neighboring communities even though his idea is sound. Banks and investment banks, however,
can mobilize savings more cheaply than Fred due to  economies of scale, economies of scope, and
experience.  Thus, Fred may seek the help of a financial intermediary to mobilize savings for his
new truck plant.
Two additional problems ("frictions") may keep savings from flowing to Fred's project.
To fund the truck plant, the financial intermediaries -- and savers in financial intermediaries --
require information about the truck design, Fred's ability to implement the design, and whether
there is a sufficient demand for better quarry trucks.  This information is difficult to obtain and
analyze. Thus, the financial system must be able to acquire reliable information about Fred's
idea before funding the truck plant.  Furthermore, if potential investors feel that Fred may steal
the funds, or run the plant poorly, or misrepresent profits, they will not provide funding.  To28
finance Fred's idea, outside creditors must have confidence that Fred will run the truck plant well.
Thus, for Fred to receive funding, the financial system must monitor managers and exert
corporate control.
While this parable does not contain all aspects of the discussion of financial functions, it
provides one cohesive story of how the five financial functions may interact to promote economic
development.
H. The Theory of Finance and Economic Growth: Agenda
In describing the conceptual links between the functioning of the financial system and
economic growth, I highlighted areas needing additional research. Two more areas are worth
emphasizing.  First, we do not have a sufficiently rigorous understanding of the emergence,
development, and economic implications of different financial structures. Financial structure --
the mix of financial contracts, markets, and institutions -- varies across countries and changes as
countries develop (Boyd and Smith 1996). Yet, we do not have adequate theories of why
different financial structures emerge or why financial structures change. Differences in legal
tradition (Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996) and differences
in national resource endowments that produce different political and institutional structures
(Stanley Engerman and Sokoloff 1996) might be incorporated into future models of financial
development.  Furthermore, economists need to develop an analytical basis for making
comparisons of financial structures; we need models that elucidate the conditions, if any, under
which different financial structures are better at mitigating information and transaction costs.
A second area needing additional theoretical research involves the influence of the level29
and growth rate of the economy on the financial system.  Some models assume that there is a
fixed cost to joining financial intermediaries. Economic growth then reduces the importance of
this fixed cost and more people join the financial system.  Thus, economic growth provides the
means for the formation of growth-promoting financial intermediaries, while the formation of
financial intermediaries accelerates growth by enhancing the allocation of capital.  In this way,
financial and economic development are  jointly determined (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990).
Economic development may affect the financial system in other ways that have not yet been
formally modelled.  For example, the costs and skills required to evaluate production technologies
and monitor managers may be very different in a service oriented-economy from that of a
manufacturing-based economy or an agricultural-based economy. Building on Hugh Patrick
(1966) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), future research may improve our understanding of
the impact of growth on financial systems.
III. Evidence
sA.  The Questions
Are differences in financial development and structure importantly associated with
differences in economic growth rates?  To assess the nature of the finance-growth relationship, I
first describe research on the links between the functioning of the financial system and economic
growth, capital accumulation, and technological change. Then, I evaluate existing evidence on
the ties between financial structure -- the mix offinancial  markets and intermediaries -- and the
functioning of the financial system.  A growing body of work demonstrates a strong, positive link
between financial development and economic growth, and there is even evidence that the level of30
financial development is a good predictor of future economic development.  Evidence on the
relationship between financial structure and the functioning of the financial system, however, is
more inconclusive.
B. The Level of Financial Development and Growth: Cross-Country Studies
Consider first the relationship between economic growth and aggregate measures of how
well the financial system functions. The seminal work in this area is by Goldsmith (1969).  He
uses the value of financial intermediary assets divided by GNP to gauge financial development
under the assumption that the size of the financial system is positively correlated with the
provision and quality of financial services. Using data on 35 countries from 1860 to 1963 (when
available) Goldsmith (1969, p. 48) finds:
(1) "... a rough parallelism can be observed between economic and financial development
if periods of several decades are considered";  and
(2) "... there are even indications in the few countries for which the data are available that
periods of more rapid economic growth have been accompanied, though not without
exception, by an above-average rate of financial development."
Goldsmith's work, however, has several weaknesses: (a) the investigation involves limited
observations on only 35 countries; (b) it does not systematically control for other factors
influencing economic growth (Levine and David Renelt 1992); (c) it does not examine whether
financial development is associated with productivity growth and capital accumulation; (d) the
size of financial intermediaries may not accurately measure the functioning of the financial
system; and (e) the close association between the size of the financial system and economic31
growth does not identify the direction of causality. 20
Recently, researchers have taken steps to address some of these weaknesses.  For example,
King and Levine (1993a,b,c) study 80 countries over the period 1960-1989, systematically control
for other factors affecting long-run growth, examine the capital accumulation and productivity
growth channels, construct additional measures of the level of financial development, and analyze
whether the level of financial development predicts long-run economic growth, capital
accumulation, and productivity growth. 2'  They use four measures of "the level of financial
development" to more precisely measure the functioning of the financial system than Goldsmith's
size measure.  Table I summarizes the values of these measures relative to real per capita GDP
(RGDP) in 1985. The first measure, DEPTH, measures the size of financial intermediaries and
equals liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing
liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP.  As shown, citizens of
the richest countries -- the top 25 percent on the basis of income per capita -- held about two-
thirds of a year's income in liquid assets in formal financial intermediaries, while citizens of the
poorest countries -- the bottom 25 percent -- held only a quarter of a year's income in liquid
assets.  There is a strong correlation between real per capita GDP and DEPTH.  The second
measure of financial development, BANK, measures the degree to which the central bank versus
20 Goldsmith (1969) recognized these weaknesses, e.g., "(T)here is no possibility, however,
of establishing with confidence the direction of the causal mechanisms, i.e., of deciding whether
financial factors were responsible for the acceleration of economic development or whether financial
development reflected economic growth whose mainsprings must be sought elsewhere." (p.48)
21 Also, see Alan Gelb (1989), Gertler and Rose (1995), Nouriel Roubini and Xavier Sala-i-
Martin (1991, 1992), William Easterly (1993), and the overview by Marco Pagano (1993).32
commercial banks are allocating credit.  BANK equals the ratio of  bank credit divided by bank
credit plus central bank domestic assets.  The intuition underlying this measure is that banks are
more likely to provide the five financial functions than central banks.  There are two notable
weaknesses with this measure, however.  Banks are not the only financial intermediaries
providing valuable financial functions and banks may simply lend to the govenunent or public
enterprises.  BANK is greater than 90 percent in the richest quartile of countries.  In contrast,
commercial banks and central banks allocate about the same amount of credit in the poorest
quartile of  countries.  The third and fourth measures partially address concerns about the
allocation of credit.  The third measures, PRIVATE, equals the ratio of credit allocated to private
enterprises to total domestic credit (excluding credit to banks).  The fourth measure, PRIVY,
equals credit to private enterprises divided by GDP. The assumption underlying these measures
is that financial systems that allocate more credit to private firms are more engaged in researching
firms, exerting corporate control, providing risk management services, mobilizing savings, and
facilitating transactions than financial systems that simply funnel credit to the government or state
owned enterprises.  As depicted in Table 1, there is a positive, statistically significant correlation
between real per capita GDP and the extent to which loans are directed to the private sector.
King and Levine (1993b,c) then assess the strength of the empirical relationship between
each of these four indicators of the level of financial development averaged over the 1960-1989
period, F, and three growth indicators also averaged over the 1960-1989 period, G. The three
growth indicators are as follows: (1) the average rate of real per capita GDP growth, (2) the
average rate of growth in the capital stock per person, and (3) total productivity growth, which is
a "Solow residual" defined as real per capita GDP growth minus (0.3) times the growth rate of the33
capital stock per person.  In other words, if F(i) represents the value of the ith indicator of
financial development (DEPTH, BANK, PRIVY, PRIVATE) averaged over the period 1960-
1989, GO) represents the value of the jth growth indicator (per capita GDP growth, per capita
capital stock growth, or productivity growth) averaged over the period 1960-1989, and X
represents a matrix of conditioning information to control for other factors associated with
economic growth (e.g., income per capita, education, political stability, indicators of exchange
rate, trade, fiscal, and monetary policy ), then the following 12 regressions are run on a cross-
section of 77 countries:
(1)  GO)= a+  pF(i)  + yX+e.
There is a strong positive relationship between each of the four financial development
indicators, F(i), and the three growth indicators G(i), long-run real per capita growth rates, capital
accumulation and productivity growth.  Table 2 summarizes the results on the 12 p's. Not only
are ,-I the financial development coefficients statistically significant, the sizes of the coefficients
imply an economically important relationship. Ignoring causality, the coefficient of 0.024 on
DEPTH implies that a country that increased DEPTH from the mean of the slowest growing
quartile of countries (0.2) to the mean of the fastest growing quartile of countries (0.6) would
have increased its per capita growth rate by almost 1 percent per year.  This is large. The
difference between the slowest growing 25 percent of countries and the fastest growing quartile of
countries is about five percent per annum over this 30 year period. Thus, the rise in DEPTH
alone eliminates 20 percent of this growth difference.
Finally, to examine whether finance simply follows growth, King and Levine (1993b)34
study whether the value of financial depth in 1960 predicts the rate of economic growth, capital
accumulation, and productivity improvements over the next 30 years.  Table 3 summarizes some
of the results.  In the three regressions reported in Table 3, the dependent variable is, respectively,
real per capital GDP growth, real per capita capital stock growth, and productivity growth
averaged over the period 1960-1989. The financial indicator in each of these regressions is the
value of DEPTH in 1960. The regressions indicate that financial depth in 1960 is significantly
correlated with each of the growth indicators averaged over the period 1960-1989.22  These
results, plus those from more sophisticated time-series studies, suggest that the initial level of
financial development is a good predictor of subsequent rates of economic growth, physical
capital accumulation, and economic efficiency improvements over the next 30 years even after
controlling for income, education, political stability, and measures of monetary, trade, and fiscal
policy.
2 3
The relationship between the initial level of financial development and growth is
economically large.  For example, the estimated coefficients suggest that if in 1960 Bolivia had
increased its financial depth from 10 percent of GDP to the mean value for developing countries
22 There are an insufficient number of observations on BANK, PRIVATE, and PRIVY in
1960 to extend the analysis in Table 3 to these variables.  Thus, King and Levine (1993b) use
pooled, cross-section, time-series data.  For each country, data permitting, they use data averaged
over the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; thus, there are potentially three observations per country. They
then, relate the value of growth averaged over the 1960s with the value of, for example, BANK in
1960, and so on for the other two decades.  They restrict the coefficients to be the same across
decades. They find that the initial level of financial development is a good predictor of subsequent
rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and economic efficiency improvements over the
next 10 years after controlling for many other factors associated with long-run growth.
23 Financial sector development tends to Granger-cause  economic  performance (Paul Wachtel
and Peter Rousseau (1995) and Klaus Neusser and Maurice Kugler 1996, but disagreement exists
(Woo Jung 1986; and Philip Arestis and Panicos Demetriades 1995).35
in 1960 (23 percent), then Bolivia would have grown about 0.4 percent faster per annum, so that
by 1990 real per capita GDP would have been about 13 percent larger than it was. 24 Thus, finance
does not merely follow economic activity. The strong link between the level of financial
development and the rate of long-run economic growth does not simply reflect contemporaneous
shocks that affect both financial development and economic performance. There is a statistically
significant and economically large empirical relationship between the initial level of financial
development and future rates of long-run growth, capital accumulation, and productivity
improvements.  Furthermore, insufficient financial development has sometimes created a 'poverty
trap' and thus become a severe obstacle to growth even when a country has established other
conditions (macroeconomic stability, openness to trade, educational attainment, etc.) for sustained
economic development (Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Aristomene Varoudakis 1996).
Some recent work has extended the frontiers of knowledge about the direction of causality
between financial development and economic growth.  For example, Rajan and Luigi Zingales
(1996) assume that financial markets in the United States are relatively frictionless.  This
benchmark country then defines each industry's efficient demand for external finance (investment
minus internal cash flow).  They then examine industries across a large sample of countries and
test whether the industries that are more dependent on external finance (in the United States) grow
relatively faster in countries that begin the sample period with better developed financial systems.
They find that industries that rely heavily on external funding grow comparatively faster in
countries with well-developed intermediaries (as measured by PRIVY) and stock markets (as
24  These examples do not consider causal issues or how to increase financial development.36
measured by  stock market capitalization) than they do in countries that start with relatively weak
financial systems.  Similarly, using firmn-level  data from 30 countries, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and
Vojislav Maksimovic (1996b) argue that firms with access to more developed  stock markets
grow at faster rates than they could have grown without this access. Furthermore, when
individual states of the United States relaxed intrastate branching restrictions, this boosted bank
lending quality and accelerated real per capita growth rates even after controlling for other growth
determinants (Jith Jayaratne and Philip Strahan 1995). Thus, using firm level- and industrial-
level data for a broad cross-section countries and data on individual states of the United States,
recent research presents evidence consistent with the view that the level of financial development
importantly affects the rate and structure of economic development.
Not surprisingly, these empirical studies do not unambiguously resolve the issue of
causality. Financial development may predict growth simply because financial systems develop
in anticipation of future economic growth.  Furthermore, differences in political systems, legal
traditions (LaPorta, et al. 1996), or institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff 1996; Douglas North
1981) may be driving both financial development and economic growth rates.  While these
studies do not prove that finance causes growth, the body of evidence would tend to push many
skeptics toward the view that the finance-growth link is a first-order relationship and that
difference in financial development can alter economic growth rates over ample time horizons.
C. Country-Case Studies
Country-case studies provide a rich complement to cross-country comparisons.  For
example, Rondo Cameron, Olga Crisp, Patrick, and Richard Tilly (1967) dissect the historical37
relationships between banking development and the early stages of industrialization for England
(1750-1844), Scotland (1750-1845), France (1800-1870), Belgium (1800-1875), Germany (1815-
1870), Russia (1860-1914), and Japan (1868-1914).  These country-case studies do not use formal
statistical analysis. Instead, the researchers carefully examine the legal, economic, and financial
linkages between banks and industry during the industrialization of these seven countries.
Typically, the case studies start by describing the political system, economic conditions, and
financial structure at the start of the period of analysis.  Then, the studies provide a detailed
description of the evolution of the financial system during a period of rapid economic
development.  Finally, the country-case studies document critical interactions among financial
intermediaries, financial markets, government policies, and the financing of industrialization.
While providing an informative complement to broad cross-country comparisons, country-case
studies rely heavily on subjective evaluations of banking system performance and fail to
systematically control for other elements determining economic development.  While
emphasizing the analytical limitations of country-case studies, Cameron (1  967b) concludes that
especially in Scotland and Japan, but also in Belgium, Germany, England, and Russia, the
banking system played a positive, growth-inducing role.
Debate exists, however.  Consider the case of Scotland between 1750 and 1845.  Scotland
began the period with per capita income of less than one-half of England's. By 1845, however,
per capita income was about the same. While recognizing that the "... dominant political event
affecting Scotland's potentialities for economic development was the Union of 1707, which made
Scotland an integral part of the United Kingdom" (Cameron (1967a, p. 60), Cameron argues that
Scotland's superior banking system is one of the few noteworthy features that can help explain its38
comparatively rapid growth."  Other analysts disagree with the 'facts' underlying this conclusion.
Some researchers suggest that England did not suffer from a dearth of financial services because
nonfinancial enterprises provided financial services in England that Cameron's (1  967a) measures
of formal financial intermediation omit.  Others argue that Scotland had rich natural resources, a
well-educated work force, access to British colonial markets, and started from a much lower level
of income per capita than England.  Consequently, it is not surprising that Scotland enjoyed a
period of rapid convergence toward England's income per capita level.  Finally, still other
researchers disagree with the premise that Scotland had a well-functioning financial system and
emphasize the deficiencies in the Scottish system (Sidney Pollard and Dieter Ziegler 1992).
Thus, although Andrew Kerr first argued in 1884 that Scotland enjoyed a better banking system
than England from 1750 until 1844, the debate about whether Scottish banking explains its faster
economic growth over the period 1750-1845 continues today.
The relationship between financial and economic development has been carefully
analyzed for many other countries. For example, Stephen Haber (1991, 1996) compares
industrial and capital market development in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States between 1830
and 1930. He finds that capital market development affected industrial composition and national
economic performance.  Specifically, Haber shows that when Brazil overthrew the monarchy in
1889 and formed the First Republic, it also dramatically liberalized restrictions on Brazilian
financial markets.  The liberalization gave more firms easier access to external finance.  Industrial
concentration fell and industrial production boomed.  While Mexico also liberalized financial
25 It is also worth noting that Scottish banking was comparatively stable over this period,
suffering fewer and less severe panics than its southern neighbor. For more on Scottish banking, see
Sydney Checkland (1975) and Tyler Cowen and Randall Kroszner (1989).39
sector policies, the liberalization was much more mild under the Diaz dictatorship (1877-1911),
which ". . .relied on the financial and political support of a small in-group of powerful financial
capitalists." (p. 561)  As a result, the decline in concentration and the increase in economic
growth was much weaker in Mexico than it was in Brazil.  Haber (1996, p.40) concludes that
differences in capital market development had a significant impact on the rate of growth of
industry....  (and that a) lack of access to institutional sources of capital because of poorly
developed capital markets was a non-negligible obstacle to industrial development in the
nineteenth century." 26
Finally, but perhaps most influencially, McKinnon's (1973) seminal book Money and
Capital in Economic Development studies the relationship between the financial system and
economic development in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan in
the post World War II period.  McKinnon interprets the mass of evidence emerging from these
country-case studies as strongly suggesting that better functioning financial systems support faster
economic growth.  Disagreement exists over many of these individual cases, and it is extremely
difficult to isolate the importance of any single factor in the process of economic growth. 27 Thus,
any statements about causality are -- and will remain -- largely impressionistic and specific to
26  Interestingly,  these  political  and  legal  impediments  to  financial  development  are
apparently  difficult to change.  In Mexico, the largest three banks control the same fraction of
commercial banking activity today, about two-thirds, as they did one hundred years ago.  Also,
Mexico has the lowest ranking of the legal protection of minority shareholder rights of any country
in  La  Porta,  et.  al.'s  (1996)  detailed  comparison  of  49  countries,  which  may  facilitate  the
concentration of economic decision making.
27 For more on Mexico see Robert Bennett 1963). For more on  Asia, see Cole and Yung
Park (1983), Park (1993) and Patrick and Park (1994).  Fry (1995) provides additional citations.40
particular countries and specific periods.  Nonetheless, the body of country-studies suggests that,
while the financial system responds to demands from the nonfinancial sector, well-functioning
financial systems have, in some cases during some time periods, importantly spurred economic
growth.
D. Financial  Functions  and Growth:  Liquidity  and Risk
I now turn to evidence on the ties between measures of the individual financial functions
and economic growth. First, consider liquidity. Deposit-taking banks can provide liquidity by
issuing liquid demand deposits and making illiquid, long-term investments.  Isolating this
liquidity function from the other financial functions performed by banks, however, has proven
prohibitively difficult. In contrast, economists have extensively studied the effects of the liquidity
of an individual security on its price.  Substantial evidence suggests a positive correlation
between the liquidity of an asset and its price (e.g., Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson 1989;
and Gregory Kadlec and John McConnell 1994). Put differently, agents must be compensated
with a lower price for purchasing an asset that is difficult to sell. These security-level studies of
the relationship between the liquidity of individual securities and their prices, however, do not
link liquidity with national long-run growth rates.
To evaluate the relationship between stock market liquidity and national growth rates,
capital accumulation rates, and rates of technological change, Levine and Sara Zervos (1996)
build on Raymond Atje and Jovanovic's (1993) study and focus on two measures of liquidity for a
broad cross-section of 49 countries over the period 1976-1993. The first liquidity indicator, the
value traded ratio, equals the total value of shares traded on a country's stock exchanges divided41
by GDP.  The value traded ratio measures trading relative to the size of the economy.  While not a
direct measure of trading costs or the uncertainty associated with trading and settling equity
transactions, theoretical models of liquidity and growth directly motivate the value traded ratio
(Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr 1995). As shown in Table 4, the value traded ratio varies
considerably across countries.  For example, the United States had an average annual value traded
ratio of 0.3 during the 1976-1993 period, while Mexico and India and value traded ratios of about
0.04.  The second indicator, the turnover ratio,  equals the total value of shares traded on a
country's stock exchanges divided by stock market capitalization (the value of listed shares on the
country's exchanges).  The turnover ratio measures trading relative to the size of the market.  The
turnover ratio also exhibits substantial cross-country variability. Very active markets such as
Japan and the United States have turnover ratios of almost 0.5, while less liquid markets, such as
Bangladesh, Chile, and Egypt have tumover ratios of 0.06 or less. 28 The turnover ratio may differ
from the value traded ratio since a small, liquid market will have high turnover ratio but a small
value traded ratio.  For example, India's average turnover ratio of 0.5 over the 1976-1993 is
greater than the United State's, but India's value traded ratio is about one-tenth the size of the
United States. These measures seek to measure liquidity on a macroeconomic scale: the objective
is to measure the degree to which agents can cheaply, quickly, and confidently trade ownership
claims of a large percentage of the economy's productive technologies. 29
Levine and Zervos (1996) then assess the strength of the empirical relationship between
28  Note, Germany's very large turnover ratio (0.7) reflects the explosion in stock market
transactions during unification.
29 Levine and Zervos (1996) also construct and examine two measures of stock trading
relative to stock price movements: (1) the value traded ratio divided by stock return volatility, and
(2)  the turnover ratio divided by stock return volatility.42
each liquidity measure and the three growth indicators: economic growth, capital accumulation,
and productivity growth.  They conduct a cross-country analysis with one observations per
country. Namely, six basic regressions are run: economic growth, capital accumulation, and
productivity growth averaged over the 1976-1993 period are regressed first on the value traded
ratio in 1976 and then on the turnover ratio in 1976 while controlling for various factors
associated with economic growth (initial income per capita, education, political stability,
indicators of exchange rate, trade, fiscal, and monetary policy) to see whether stock market
liquidity predicts subsequent economic growth. Importantly, the level of banking sector
development (bank credit to private enterprises divided by GDP) measured in 1976 is included in
the regressions to assess the independent link between stock market liquidity and growth after
controlling for other aspects of financial development. The results are summarized in Table 5.
The initial level of stock market liquidity -- measured either by the turnover ratio or the value
traded ratio -- is a statistically significant predictor of economic growth, capital accumulation, and
productivity growth over the next 18 years.  The sizes of the coefficients also suggest an
economically meaningful relationship. For example, the results imply that if Mexico had had the
sample average value traded ratio in 1976 (0.044) instead of its realized 1976 value (0.004), per
capita GDP would have grown at a 0.4% faster rate (0.04*0.098). Accumulating over the 18 year
period, this implies each Mexican would have enjoyed almost 8 per cent higher income in 1994.
The results are consistent with the views that the liquidity services provided by stock markets are
independently important for long-run growth and that stock markets provide different financial
services from those provided by financial intermediaries (or else they would not both enter the43
growth regressions significantly). 30
Besides the difficulty of assigning a causal role to stock market liquidity, there are
important limitations to accurately measuring liquidity (Sanford Grossman and Merton Miller
1988; and Stephen Wells 1994). Theory suggests that economies will benefit from the ability to
trade ownership of an economy's productive technologies easily.  Stock markets, however, are
only one mechanism for providing liquidity.  Banks and bond markets may also provide liquidity.
Thus, measures of stock market liquidity might omit important financial arrangements for
providing liquidity.  Moreover, the liquidity indicators measure stock transactions on a country's
national stock exchanges. The physical location of the stock market, however, should not
necessarily matter for the provision of liquidity. That is, Californian savers and firms would
probably not have greater access to liquidity if the New York Stock Exchange were to move to
Los Angeles.  Thus, measures of the trading of equities on a country's exchanges may not gauge
fully the degree of stock market liquidity available to the economy. This measurement problem
will increase over time if economies become more financially integrated and firms list and issue
shares on foreign exchanges.
Besides liquidity risk, the financial system also provides mechanisms for hedging and
trading the idiosyncratic risk associated with individual projects, firms, industries, sectors, and
countries.  While a vast literature examines the pricing of risk, there exists very little empirical
evidence that directly links risk diversification services with long-run economic growth.
Moreover, the only study of the relationship between economic growth and the ability of
30 Stock market size, as measured by market capitalization divided by GDP, is not robustly
correlated with growth, capital accumulation, and productivity improvements.44
investors to diversify risk internationally through equity markets yields inconclusive results
(Levine and Zervos 1996).
One common weakness in empirical work on liquidity, idiosyncratic risk, and economic
growth is that it focuses on equity markets.  Bond markets and financial intermediaries may also
provide mechanisms for diversifying risk.  Indeed, technological, regulatory, and tax differences
across countries may imply that different financial structures arise to  provide liquidity and risk
diversification vehicles.  For examnple,  in one economy the costs to establishing an intermediary
may be high while the costs to conducting equity transactions are low. The reverse may hold in a
second economy.  The first economy may provide liquidity and risk diversification services
primarily through equity markets, while the second does it through financial intermediaries. The
first economy has an active stock exchange, so that existing empirical studies would classify it as
providing substantial liquidity and risk diversification services. In contrast, existing studies
would classify the second economy as financially underdeveloped. Thus, measuring the
performance of one part of the financial system may generate a misleading indicator of the
functioning of the whole financial system.
E. Financial Functions and Growth: Information
Theory strongly suggests that financial intermediaries play an important role in
researching productive technologies before investment and monitoring managers and projects
after funneling capital to those projects. Although it is very difficult to measure whether a
country's financial system is comparatively adept at reducing infornation  acquisition costs firm
level studies provide insights into the role played by financial intermediaries in easing45
information asymmetries (Fabio Schiantarelli 1995). Theory suggests that as the costs to
outsiders of acquiring information about a firm rise, firm investment decisions become more
tightly constrained by retained earnings and current cash flow. Thus, firm level studies test
whether the investment decisions of firms with particular traits that proxy for the costs to
outsiders of acquiring information are more sensitive to cash flow than firms without those traits.
The sample selection criterion varies across studies.
The empirical evidence suggests that the investment decisions of firms with more severe
asymmetric information problems are more sensitive to cash flow than firms where it is less
expensive for outsiders to monitor.  This conclusion holds when firms are classified according to
whether they have received bond ratings (Toni Whited 1992; Charles Calomiris, Charles
Himmelberg, and Wachtel 1995), whether firms are issuing large or small dividends (Steven
Fazzari, Glen Hubbard, and Bruce Peterson 1988; Hubbard, Anil Kashyap, and Whited 1995),
whether firms are large or small (James Tybout 1983; Gertler and Simon Gilchrist 1994), whether
firms place a relatively high or low shadow value on internal funds based on their response to
taxes (Calomiris and Hubbard 1995), and whether regulations restrict bank credit allocation (Fidel
Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, Weiss 1996; John Harris, Schiantarelli, and Miranda Siregar 1994). In
sum, when outsiders find it expensive to evaluate and fund particular firms, those firms find it
relatively difficult to raise capital for investment and rely disproportionately on internal sources of
finance.  Thus, financial innovations or policies that lower information asymmetries ease firm
financing constraints on more efficient firms.
More importantly for this section, a large body of work shows that when firms have close
ties to financial intermediaries, this reduces information costs and eases firm financing46
constraints. Specifically,  firms  with close ties to banks tend  to be less constrained  in their
investment  decisions  than  those with less intimate,  less mature  banking  relationships  as shown  for
Japan (Takeo  Hoshi, Kashyap,  and Scharfstein  1990),  Italy (Schiantarelli  and Alessandro
Sembenelli  1996),  and the United  States  (Petersen  and Rajan 1994). Furthermore,  borrowers  with
longer banking  relationships  pay lower  interest  rates and are less likely  to pledge  collateral  than
borrowers  with less mature  banking  relationships  (Petersen  and Rajan 1994;  and Allen Berger  and
Gregory  Udell 1995). Finally,  stock  price evidence  also indicates  that banks produce  valuable,
private information  about  borrowers. When banks sign  loan agreements  with borrowers,
borrower-firm  stock  prices  respond  positively  (Christopher  James 1987;  Scott  Lummar  and John
McConnell  1989;  and James  and Weir 1990). The value of the information  obtained  by banks
about firms  can also be exemplified  by Continental  Illinois'  troubles  in the mid-1980s. Myron
Slovin,  Marie Sushka,  and John  Polonchek  (1993)  show  that the banks'  impending  insolvency
negatively  affected  the stock  prices of its client firms  and that the FDIC's  rescue efforts  positively
affected  the stock  prices  of those same  clients. These findings  are consistent  with the view that
the durability  of bank-borrower  relationship  is valuable. The evidence  directly  indicates  an
important  role for financial  intermediaries  in reducing  informational  asymmetries  between  firm
insiders  and outside  investors. Indirectly,  the evidence  suggests  that countries  with financial
institutions  that are effective  at relieving  information  barriers  will promote  faster  economic
growth  through  more investment  than countries  with financial  systems  that are less effective  at
obtaining  and processing  information.47
F. Patterns of Financial Development
I now turn to the question: Does financial structure change as countries develop and does
it differ across countries?  Again, Goldsmith pioneered the cross-country work in this area.  He
traced the relationship between the mix of financial intermediaries and economic development for
35 countries over the period 1860-1963. The World Bank (1989) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1996b) recently extended Goldsmith's work by examining the association between the mix of
financial intermediaries, markets, and economic development for approximately 50 countries over
the period 1970-1993. This work finds that financial structure differs importantly across
countries and changes as countries develop economically.
Four basic findings emerge from these studies, which are illustrated in Figure 2.  As
countries get richer over time or as one shifts from poor to richer countries,
(1)  financial intermediaries get larger as measured by the total assets or liabilities of
financial intermediaries relative to GDP;
(2)  banks grow relative to the central bank in allocating credit;
(3)  non-banks -- such as insurance companies, investment banks, finance companies,
and private pension funds -- grow in importance; and
(4)  stock markets become larger, as measured by market capitalization relative to
GDP, and more liquid, as measured by trading relative to GDP, market
capitalization, and stock price variability.
While these "patterns" pose a challenge to financial theorists, they must be treated
cautiously because the data suffer from numerous problems. For example, it is difficult to48
distinguish private from public banks and development banks from commercial banks in many
countries.  Similarly, the definition of a bank and of a non-bank are not always consistent across
countries.  Furthermore, there is nothing causal about these relationships.  These patterns alone
do not suggest that poor countries can accelerate their growth rates by changing the structure of
their financial systems.  Finally, many differences exist across countries at similar stages of
economic development (World Bank 1989). For example, the assets of deposit banks composed
56% of financial system assets in France, while the comparable number in the United Kingdom
was 35%.  The assets of contractual savings institutions composed 26% of total financial system
assets in the United Kingdom, while in France the figure was only 7% in 1985. Thus, while there
is a general trend involving financial structure and the level of GDP per capita, there are
important exceptions and differences within income groups.  While one must be hesitant in
drawing conclusions about patterns of financial development, an even greater degree of hesitancy
is called for in linking financial structure to economic growth.
G. Financial Structure and Economic Growth
There exists considerable debate, with sparse evidence and insufficient theory, about the
relationship between financial structure and economic growth.  After briefly outlining the major
examples used in discussions of financial structure, I describe the major analytical limitations
impeding research on financial structure and economic growth.  The classic controversy involves
the comparison between Germany and the United Kingdom.  Starting early in this century,
economists argued that differences in the financial structure of Germany and England help
explain Germany's more rapid economic growth rate during the latter half of the 19th century and49
the first decade of the 20th century (Alexander Gerschenkron 1962). The premise is as follows.
Germany's  bank-based financial system, where banks have close ties to industry, reduces the
costs of acquiring information about firms.  This makes it easier for the financial system to
identify good investments, exert corporate control, and mobilize savings for promising
investments than in England's more securities market oriented financial system, where the ties
between banks and industry are less intimate.  Indeed, quite a bit of evidence suggests that
German banks were more closely tied to industry than British bankers.  Unlike England, nearly all
German bankers started as merchants.  The evolution from entrepreneur to banker may explain
the comparatively close bonds between bankers and industrialists. For example, German bankers
frequently " . . . mapped out a firm's paths of growth, conceived farsighted plans, decided on
major technological innovations, and arranged for mergers and capital increases" (Gerschenkron
1968, p. 137).  Private German bankers also organized and promoted an impressive array of
major manufacturing companies during the mid-19th century (Tilly 1967, p. 179). Besides this
entrepreneurial role, some evidence suggests that German bankers tended to be more committed
to the long-term funding of their clients than English bankers. Short term credits could be
transformed into longer-term securities more easily in Germany (Tilly 1967, p. 178-181).  Thus,
various pieces of evidence suggest a closer relationship between banker and industrialist in
Germany than in the United Kingdom.  While bank-industry relationships may have been closer
in Germany, this does not imply that the German financial system was better at risk management,
providing liquidity, or facilitating transaction.  Furthermore, economists disagree over whether
the growth differential between the U.K. and Germans was really very large.  Although German
manufacturing production grew noticeably faster than Britain's in the six decades before World50
War I, Germany's overall per capita GNP growth rate was 1.55 while the U.K.'s was 1.35 over the
period 1850 to 1913 (Goldsmith 1969, p. 406-407).  Thus, aggregate growth differences between
Germany and the United Kingdom are not very large, the significant differences that do exist are
industry specific, and other factors besides differences in financial structure may explain industry
specific growth differentials over this period.
The debate concerning bank-based versus market-based systems  eventually expanded to
include comparisons with the United States. German banks are larger as a share of GDP than
U.S. banks and German bankers tend to be more intricately involved in the management of
industry than U.S. bankers (Randall Pozdena and Volbert Alexander 1992; Franklin Allen and
Gale 1994; and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1996a). Furthermore, historical evidence suggests
that German universal banks were more efficient (lower cost of capital) than U.S. banks over the
1870-1914 period and suffered less systemic problems than the U.S. banking system (Calomiris
1994).  In contrast, the U.S. financial system is typically characterized as having a comparatively
larger, more active securities markets with more equities held by households.  These observations
suggest that the German bank-based system may reduce information asymmetries and thereby
allow banks to allocate capital more efficiently and to exert corporate control more effectively.  In
contrast, the United States' securities market-based financial system may offer advantages in
terms of  boosting risk sharing opportunities (Allen and Gale 1994). While this functional
approach highlights the relevant issues, substantially more research is needed before drawing
conclusions about the dominance of one financial structure over another. 3'
3' Park (1993) compares the structure and functioning of the financial systems of Korea and
Taiwan in relation to their industrial composition.51
Many of the arguments involving bank-based versus securities market-based financial
systems have been used to compare Japan and the United States. For example, research suggests
that Japanese bankers are more closely tied to industrial clients than U.S. bankers.  This closer
connection may mitigate information asymmetries (Hoshi, et al. 1990), which may foster better
investment and faster growth. Thus, the structure of the Japanese financial system is sometimes
viewed as superior to the financial structure of the United States and an important factor in
Japan's faster growth rate over the last four decades.  Interestingly, however, the recent banking
problems and slower growth in Japan have led some to argue that the absence of a credible
takeover threat through efficient stock markets has impeded proper corporate governance and
competitiveness (Oxford Analytica 11/27/1995). These conflicting analyses highlight the need
for better empirical measures of financial structure and the functions provided by financial
systems.
There are severe analytical problems with linking financial structure to economic
performance.  First, existing research on financial structure does not quantify the structure of
financial systems or how well different financial systems function overall.  For example, German
bankers may have been more closely connected to industrialists than their British counterparts,
but less capable at providing liquidity and facilitating transactions. Similarly, while Japanese
Keiretsu may lower information acquisition costs between banks and firms, this does not
necessarily imply that the Japanese financial system provides greater risk sharing mechanisms or
more accurately spot promising new lines of business. Furthermore, while Japan is sometimes
viewed as a bank-based system, it has one of the best developed stock markets in the world
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1996a). Thus, the lack of quantitative measures of  financial52
structure and the functioning of financial systems make it difficult to compare financial structures.
Second, given the array of factors influencing growth in Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, it is analytically difficult -- and perhaps reckless -- to attribute
differences in growth rates to differences in the financial sector. Moreover, over the post World
War-I1  period, the devastated Axis powers may simply have been converging to the income levels
of the United States, such that observed growth rate differentials have little to do with financial
structure.  Thus, before linking financial structure with economic growth, researchers need to
control for other factors influencing long-run growth.
A third factor that complicates the analysis of financial structure and economic growth is
more fundamental.  The current debate focuses on bank-based systems versus market-based
systems.  Some aggregate and firm level evidence, however, suggest that this dichotomy is
inappropriate.  The data indicate that both stock market liquidity -- as measured by stock trading
relative to GDP and market capitalization -- and the level of banking development -- as measured
by bank credits to private firms divided by GDP predict economic growth over subsequent
decades (Levine and Zervos 1996). Thus, it is not banks or stock markets; bank and stock market
development indicators both predict economic growth.  Perhaps, the debate should not focus on
bank-based versus market-based systems because these two components of the financial system
enter the growth regression significantly and predict future economic growth.  It may be that
stock markets provide a different bundle of financial functions from those provided by financial
intermediaries.  For example, stock markets may primarily offer vehicles for trading risk and
boosting liquidity.  In contrast, banks may focus on ameliorating information acquisition costs
and enhancing corporate governance of major corporations. This is merely a conjecture, however.53
There are important overlaps between the services provided by banks and stock markets.  As
noted above, well-functioning stock markets may ameliorate information acquisition costs, and
banks may provide instruments for diversifying risk and enhancing liquidity. Thus, to understand
the relationship between financial structure and economic growth, we need theories of the
simultaneous emergence of stock markets and banks and we need empirical proxies of the
functions performed by the different components of financial systems.
A fourth factor limiting our understanding of the links between financial structure and
economic growth is that researchers have focused on a few industrialized countries due to data
limitations.  The United States, German, Japan, and the United Kingdom have basically the same
standard of living.  Averaged over a sufficiently long time period, they must also have very
similar growth rates.  Thus, comparisons of financial structure and economic development using
only these countries will tend to suggest that financial structure is unrelated to the level and
growth rate of economic development.  Future studies will need to incorporate a more diverse
selection of countries to have even a chance of identifying patterns between financial structure
and economic development.
Finally, there are important interactions between stock markets and banks during
economic development that have not been the focus of bank-based versus market-based
comparisons.  As noted, greater stock market liquidity is associated with faster rates of capital
formation.  Nonetheless, new equity sales do not finance much of this new investment (Colin
Mayer 1988), though important differences exist across countries (Ajit Singh, et. al. 1992). Most
new corporate investment is financed by retained earnings and debt. This raises a quandary: stock
market liquidity is positively associated with investment, but equity sales do not finance much of54
this investment.  This quandary is confirmed by firm-level studies.  In relatively poor countries,
enhanced stock market liquidity actually tends to boost corporate debt-equity ratios; stock market
liquidity does not induce a substitution out of debt and into equity finance (Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic 1996a). However, for industrialized countries, debt-equity ratios fall as stock market
liquidity rises; stock market liquidity induces a substitution out of debt finance. The evidence
suggests complex interactions between the functioning of stock markets and corporate decisions
to borrow from banks that depend on the overall level of economic development. Thus, we need
considerably more research into the links among stock markets, banks, and corporate financing
decisions to understand the relationship between financial structure and economic growth.55
IV, Conclusions
Since Goldsmith (1969) documented the relationship between financial and economic
development thirty years ago, the profession has made important progress.  Rigorous theoretical
work carefully illuminates many of the channels through which the emergence of financial
markets and institutions affect -- and are affected by -- economic development.  A growing body
of empirical analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country-
studies, and broad cross-country comparisons, demonstrate a strong positive link between the
functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth. Theory and evidence make it
difficult to conclude that the financial system merely -- and automatically -- responds to
industrialization and economic activity, or that financial development is an inconsequential
addendum to the process of economic growth.  I believe that we will not have a sufficient
understanding of long-run economic growth until we understand the evolution and functioning of
financial systems.  This conclusion about financial development and long-run growth has an
important corollary: although financial panics and recessions are critically important issues, the
finance-growth link goes beyond the relationship between finance and shorter-term fluctuations.
Undoubtedly, the financial system is shaped by nonfinancial developments. Changes in
telecommunications, computers, nonfinancial sector policies, institutions, and economic growth
itself influence the quality of financial services and the structure of the financial system.
Technological improvements lower transaction costs and affect financial arrangements (Merton
1992). Monetary and fiscal policies affect the taxation of financial intermediaries and the
provision of financial services (Bencivenga and Smith 1992; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995).
Legal systems affect financial systems (LaPorta, et. al. 1996), and political changes and national56
institutions critically influence financial development (Haber 1991, 1996).  Furthermore,
economic growth alters the willingness of savers and investors to pay the costs associated with
participating in the financial system (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). While economists have
made important advances, we need much more research on financial development.  Why does
financial structure change as countries grow?  Why do countries at similar stages of economic
development have different looking financial systems? Are there long-run economic growth
advantages to adopting legal and policy changes that create one type of financial structure vis-a-
vis another?  Much more information about the determinants and implications of financial
structure will move us closer to a comprehensive view of financial development and economic
growth.57
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Correlation
with Real per
Indicators  Very rich  Rich  Poor  Very poor  Capita GDP in  (P-value)
1985
DEPTH  0.67  0.51  0.39  0.26  0.51  (0.0001)
BANK  0.91  0.73  0.57  0.52  0.58  (0.0001)
PRIVATE  0.71  0.58  0.47  0.37  0.51  (0.0001)
PRIVY  0.53  0.31  0.20  0.13  0.70  (0.0001)
RGDP85  13053  2376  754  241
Observations  29  29  29  29
Key:
Very rich:  Real GDP per Capita >  4998
Rich:  Real GDP per Capita  >  1161 and < 4998
Poor:  Real GDP per Capita  > 391 and < 1161
Very poor:  Real GDP per Capita  < 391
DEPTH =  Liquid liabilities to GDP
BANK =  Deposit money bank domestic credit divided by deposit money
bank + central bank domestic credit
PRIVATE =  Claims on the non-financial private sector to total domestic credit
PRIVY =  Gross claims on private sector to GDP
RGDP85 =  Real per capita GDP in 1985 (in constant 1987 dollars)
Source: King and Levine (1 993a)Table 2: Growth and contemporaneousfinancial  indicators, 1960-89
Dependant Variable  DEPTH  BANK  PRIVATE  PRIVY
Real Per Capita GDP Growth  0.024***  0.032***  0.034***  0.032***
[0.007]  [0.005]  [0.002]  [0.002]
R 2 0.5  0.5  0.52  0.52
Real Per Capita Capital Stock Growth  0.022***  0.022**  0.020**  0.025***
[0.001]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.001]
R2  0.65  0.62  0.62  0.64
Productivity Growth  0.018**  0.026**  0.027***  0.025***
[0.026]  [0.010]  [0.003]  [0.006]
R2 0.42  0.43  0.45  0.44
[P-values in brackets]  Observations = 77
* significant  at the 0.10 level, *  significant  at the 0.05 level,  ***  significant  at the 0.01 level.
DEPTH =  Liquid liabilities to GDP
BANK =  Deposit bank domestic credit divided by deposit money
bank + central bank domestic credit
PRIVATE =  Claims on the non-financial private sector to total claims
PRIVY =  Gross claims on private sector to GDP
Productivity Growth =  Real Per Capita GDP Growth - (0.3)*Real Per Capita
Capital Stock Growth
Other  explanatory  variables  included  in each of the twelve  regressions:  log of initial  income,
log of initial  secondary  school  enrollment  rate, ratio of government  consumption  expenditures  to GDP,
inflation  rate, and ratio of exports  plus imports  to GDP.
Source: King and Levine (I 993b)Table 3: Growth  and initialfinancial  depth, 1960-1989
Per Capita  Per Capita Capital  Productivity
Growth,  1960-1989  Growth,  1960-1989  Growth, 1960-1989
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enrollment  in 1960)  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]
Government  0.07*  0.049*  0.056*
consumption/GDP  in 1960  [0.051]  [0.064]  [0.076]
Inflation  in 1960  0.037  0.02  0.029
[0.239]  [0.238]  [0.292]
(Imports  plus Exports)/GDP  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003
in 1960  [0.604]  [0.767]  [0.603]
DEPTH  (liquid liabilities)  0.028***  0.019***  0.022***
in 1960  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]
R-Squared  0.61  0.63  0.58
[P-values  in brackers]
* significant  at the 0.10 level,  ** significant  at the 0.05 level, *** significant  at the 0.01 level.
Observations = 57
Source:  King and Levine (1  993b)Table 4: Stock Market Liquidity Measures:  Selected Countries,  Annual Averages 1976-1993
Turnover Ratio  Value Traded Ratio  Per Capita GDP Growth
Low-income
Bangladesh  0.015  0.000  1.89%
Cote  d'lvoire  0.028  0.001  -2.50%
Egypt  0.060  0.030  3.56%
India  0.537  0.036  2.43%
Nigeria  0.006  0.000  -0.11%
Pakistan  1  0.105  0.008  3.13%
Zimbabwe  0.059  0.010  -0.97%
lower-middle income
Colombia  0.087  0.004  1.95%
Costa  Rica  0.013  0.001  0.89%
Indonesia  0.193  0.010  4.18%
Jordan  0.154  0.085  3.01%
Philippines  0.250  0.026  0.21%
Thailand  0.739  0.144  5.90%
Turkey  0.207  0.026  2.32%
uWWer-mLddLe-incom
Argentina  0.266  0.013  0.22%
Brazil  0.355  0.041  0.65%
Chile  0.060  0.021  3.61%
Korea  0.832  0.186  9.67%
Malaysia  0.230  0.243  4.27%
Mauritius  0.059  0.003  1.76%
Mexico  0.498  0.044  0.85%
Portugal  0.108  0.014  2.85%
high-income
0  Australia  =  0.256  0.124  1.57%
Germany  0.704  0.156  0.95%
Great  Britain  0.349  0.253  1.75%
Hong  Kong  0.372  0.471  6.20%
Israel  0.669  0.144  1.72%
Italy  =  0.253  0.028  2.68%
Japan  0.469  0.406  3.42%
Netherlands  0.490  0.123  1.43%
Norway  0.318  0.059  2.48%
Spain  0.216  0.045  1.75%
Switzerland  0.467  0.442  1.16%
United  Statesi  0.493  0.299  1.67%
Tumover Ratio = Value of Domestic Equities Traded on Domestic Exchanges Divided by Market Capialization
Value Traded Ratio = Value of Domestic Equities Traded on Domestic Exchanges Divided by GDP
Income classifications from the World Bank's 1995 World Development Report
Low-income  economies= average GNP per capita of $380 in 1993
Lower-middle-income  economies = average GNP per capita of $1,590  in 1993
Upper-middle-income  economies = average GNP per capita of $4,370 in 1993
High-income economies = average GNP per capita of $23,090 in 1993
Sources: Intemational Finance Corporation, and Moigan Stanley Capital lntemationalTable 5: Growth  and initial  stock market liquidity,  1976-1993
Dependant Variable  Value Traded  Turnover Ratio Ratio
Real Per Capita GDP Growth  0.098***  0.027***
[0.003]  [0.006]
Adjusted R2 0.33  0.34
Real Per Capita Capital Stock Growth  0.093***  0.022**
[0.005]  [0.023]
Adjusted R2 0.38  0.35
Productivity  Growth  0.075***  0.020**
[0.001]  [0.030]
Adjusted R2 0.21  0.21
[P-values in brackets]  Observations = 42
* significant  at the 0.10 level,  ** significant  at the 0.05 level,  *  significant  at the 0.01 level.
Value  Traded  Ratio = Value  of domestic  equity  transactions  on domestic  stock exchanges  divided  by GDP
Turnover  Ratio  = Value of domestic  equity  transactions  on domestic  stock  exchanges  divided  by
domestic  market  capitalization.
Other  explanatory  variables  included  in each of the six regressions:
log of initial  income,  log of initial  secondary  school  enrollment,
initial  ratio of govemnement  expenditures  to GDP,  initial  inflation  rate,
initial  black  market  exchange  rate  premium,  initial  ratio of commercial  bank lending  to
private  enterprises  divided  by GDP.
Source:  Levine  and Zervos (1996)Figure  1:  A Theoretical  Approach  to Finance  and  Growth
Market  frictions
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- exert corporate control
- facilitate risk management
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I  v  I~±Figure 2: Financial Structure in Low-, Middle-, and High-income Economies, 1990
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